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Abstract 
 The primary purpose of this study was to examine what kind of threats are associated 
with functioning of the shale gas well testing installation, and also how failures of the 
installation influence the safety of the residents living nearby. With the development of the 
shale gas industry in Poland, the discussion about the influence of hydraulic fracturing on the 
social and environmental safety has been raised. This discussion neglected the risks associated 
with the surface operations, which the author wanted to study.  
 The risk assessment was performed in two parts. It began from qualitative analysis in a 
form of the Structure What-If Template on the overall facility level. Next, on the basis of the 
SWIFT results, the major hazardous elements of the installation were chosen to simulate their 
failure consequences in the PHAST software. These simulations were part of the Quantitative 
Risk Assessment, which revealed information about required setbacks and risk contours.  
 In conclusion, the thesis argued about severity of the Polish setback rules, negligence 
of the risks associated with the surface well site functioning and lack of transparency from the 
operators. Even though the assessment had many shortcomings and was weakened by 
different types of uncertainty, it may be a good starting point for the discussion how the 
operators are guaranteeing the surface operations safety for the local residents. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Background of the thesis 
 It was known from 19
th
 century that in the shale there may be trapped a lot of natural 
gas. But until 1998, when the first slick-water fracturing was performed in the shale 
formation, the shale gas was seen as an uneconomic source of hydrocarbons and its role was 
marginal. There were only several production wells, all located in United States, all 
characterised by low performance (Wang & Krupnick, 2013).  Everything changed when the 
slick-water fracturing technique was firstly performed in the formation of this kind. It was a 
breakthrough that made shale gas exploitation cheaper, becoming an interesting alternative to 
the conventional methods. It boosted the whole industry in such a way, that the total 
production share of shale gas rose from below 1% level in 1998 to almost 40% in 2012, which 
is an equivalent of 9,7 trillion cubic feet. What is more, the prediction says that shale gas will 
grow even more to 53% in 2040, reaching a production level of almost 20 trillion cubic feet 
(EIA, 2015).   
 Many countries, especially those which were not rich in conventional natural 
resources, had seen a great opportunity in developing the shale gas industry in their countries. 
It was a chance for them to increase their energetic independency and take advantage of other 
economical benefits. One of those countries was Poland which 32% of energy resources was 
imported in 2008, but the domestic gas production was covering below 30% of the demand 
(Kaliski et al., 2010). That is why, the government saw a great opportunity in shale gas 
production to improve the Polish energy security and improve the overall economy. It was 
caused by the common appearance of shale formations in Poland and initial estimations of 
United States Energy Information Administration, which stated that Poland had 5,3 trillion 
Nm
3
 of recoverable gas in shale (Marocchi & Fedirko, 2013). The Figure 1 shows the map of 
the shale basins of Poland and their perceptiveness. 
 These estimations and no objections against hydraulic fracturing encouraged many 
petroleum companies to acquire concessions and explore three Polish shale basins. After 
initial exploring the first well was drilled in 2010 and in 2012 the gas finally started to flow 
and the first tests were carried out. Unfortunately the first estimations of potential resources 
were far too optimistic. The most recent report of Polish Geological Institute states that the 
shale gas resources are between the 346,1-767,9 billion Nm
3
(PGI, 2012), however these 
predictions are based on the analysis of 39 wells drilled from 1950 to 1990, which means that 
their reliability is questionable. To accurately assess the potential of these basins basing on the 
more practical knowledge, dozens of wells have to be drilled. By the end of 2014, the number 
of drilled wells was only 68(MoE, 2015), comparing to 25 145 in United States by the end of 
2007 (Vidas & Hugman, 2008). This information and results of first well testing resulted in 
slightly less concessions acquired. From 2009 to 2011 there were 97 concessions granted and 
in the beginning of 2015 there are only 47 valid concessions(MoE,2015). 
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   Figure 1 Shale basins of Poland (ARI, 2011) 
 Not only the estimations are slowing down the development, but also the high costs of 
drilling and other expenses connected to gas production. In the United States costs are way 
smaller as industry is more developed and the technology is well-established, in opposition to 
Poland, where oil and gas industry is slightly underdeveloped. What is more, the breakeven 
point for the polish shale gas is said to be somewhere between 5-12$ per MMbtu(IEA, 
2012)(JRC, 2012), depending on the reservoir and infrastructure conditions, whereas the price 
of imported gas to the European Union in the last five years was in the range 7,5-13$ per 
MMbtu(YCharts, 2015). This means that the potential shale gas production in Poland would 
balance on the verge of profitability. Nevertheless, the government is committed to facilitate 
administrative procedures and offer tax reductions in order to encourage the petroleum 
companies to invest in Poland. These steps are reasoned by a strong will to improve the 
energy security and become more independent from foreign suppliers. 
 Polish society is one of the most enthusiastic supporters of the shale gas development, 
especially comparing to other European nations, community surveys showed that only 9% of 
poles are afraid of possible threats to the environment(Łupki Polskie, 2013). These surveys 
were performed on a random population, which are not giving a good picture of how 
enthusiastic are the people living close to the wellsite. These wellsites are mostly located in 
countryside in weakly urbanized areas, where the percentage of high-educated people is little. 
Their knowledge about petroleum industry is commonly limited to discoveries of Ignacy 
Łukasiewicz, which means that they are not able to properly assess the reliability of 
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information spread by for and against lobbyists. On the one hand they are afraid about their 
lives and water sources, on the other, they see a great benefits for the commune from the 
royalty tax. As a result, in several countries in Europe like Germany or France the social 
anxiety was so great that shale gas exploitation was banned without detailed investigation of 
its influences on the society and environment(Petro Global News, 2013). 
  
 
1.2 Aim of the thesis 
 The desire of every petroleum company searching for hydrocarbons is establishing 
beneficial production. This is done in several stages, whereas the first one in seismic 
exploration and geological surveys, the second one is drilling, the well testing is the third and 
setting up the production is the final phase. Each step can be only performed when the 
previous one is successful. In this thesis the well testing will be thoroughly analysed in the 
context of hazards and risk. It is an important phase as it is revealing the biggest amount of 
information about the reservoir and on the basis of this tests the production predictions are 
created. In case of weak reservoir parameters the fourth step can be forfeit, and the well can 
be closed. This scenario is  very probable in Poland where the geology of shale is still not 
sufficiently recognized and to improve the geological knowledge many wells have to be 
drilled, from which only a small percentage will probably appear to be beneficial. 
 The aim of this thesis is to investigate if the shale gas well testing installation is 
dangerous for the residents living nearby the facility. The thesis will be performed in form of 
extensive risk analysis from the perspective of these people. It will be concentrating on their 
safety, not the safety of workers or profits of the company. The thesis will also raise issues of 
Polish safety standards, if they are rigorous enough comparing to the international ones. 
Moreover the most dangerous parts of the installation will be identified, which may result in 
valuable feedback to the operator safety solutions.  The description of the theory will be an 
introduction to risk analysis of the existing installation on well LE-1 near Strzeszewo. The 
analysis will include both qualitative and quantitative risk assessments which are 
complimentary to each other.  
 Nevertheless, the main aim of this thesis is to determine the real hazard which shale 
gas well testing installation is causing, so that people could have a reliable source of 
information and no longer have to rely on rumours and unconfirmed information. There are 
several examples in Polish press, where local residents are describing their fears concerning 
the installation(Lebork Nasze Miasto, 2013)(Kurier-W, 2014). If the installation is really life-
threatening then it may be necessary to create proper safety procedures, improve the Polish 
safety standards or even consider banning the development of the shale gas production. 
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1.3 Limitations 
 This thesis has no intention to analyze the threats and dangers associated with 
hydraulic fracturing which is said to be polluting water sources. This analysis will concentrate 
on assessing the risk and consequences related to the installations and activities which are 
taking place on the surface.  
 Also it must be underlined that the thesis will not try to find solutions for decreasing 
the risk, but it would rather concentrate on identifying the most hazardous elements, events 
and consequences of its failure. Moreover the thesis will not include any detailed 
recommendations for the company owning the facility or the workers. As the data about their 
existing safety procedures and systems is unknown. 
 Finally, the analysis will try to stay politically neutral, as the shale gas development is 
strongly influenced by politicians and various lobbyists. Obviously the risk picture will not be 
influenced by the politics, but the further recommendations and conclusions could be. 
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2. Location and installation description 
 
2.1 Location 
 The facility is located 300 meters west from village Strzeszewo in the administrative 
district of Gmina Wicko, within Lębork County, Pomeranian Voivodeship, in northern 
Poland, only about 10 kilometres from coast in straight line and next to the provincial road 
number 213.  The Figure 2 shows the Strzeszewo area map, whereas the wellsite is marked 
with the orange square.  
 
Figure 2 Strzeszewo area map (Google, 2015) 
 According to national census the population of Strzeszewo is 241. Most of residents 
are living from farming and rural tourism. The facility has been established in fourth quarter 
of 2012 and the first drilling started in December 2012, in second quarter of 2013 there was 
performed the first hydraulic fracturing. From the end of 2013 the well testing has started.  
 Unfortunately the test results revealed an insufficient reservoir parameters which 
resulted in closing the well and not proceeding to the production phase. The peak production 
during tests has reached 8 000 Nm
3
 per day, which was below the break-even point.  
 
2.2 Role of well testing 
 Well testing is one of the most important phases of establishing the production facility. 
During the well testing the final decision about continuing the exploration is taken. That is 
why in the future the number of well testing installations might be a way larger than the 
number of production facilities. The ratio of reservoirs which exploration is finished during 
well testing to the ones that are producing gas for years is especially large when the 
knowledge about the geology and reservoirs parameters is little, like in Poland. 
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         Figure 3 Wellsite in Strzeszewo (3legs Resources, 2015a) 
 After the well is drilled, the shale is fractured and the gas is present in the well, the 
testing installation can be installed. The aim of such an installation is to determine the 
characteristics of the reservoir like pressure, boundaries, permeability or zone contribution. 
These parameters are necessary to finally describe the potential of a given well and its 
economical feasibility, as a presence of a gas in well is not an only requirement to become a 
production well. 
 The installation itself is a simplified and minimized production installation. The 
treatment of the gas is quite similar to the production process, but in case of well testing it is 
flared, not stored. Figure 3 presents the existing wellsite in Strzeszewo, before it was closed. 
The well is located in the centre of the parcel, whereas the installation is adjacent to it. The 
surrounding area is occupied by many other structures like spare parts magazines, offices and 
living quarters. The core operational personnel consists of about 40 people, which are 
working daily on two twelve hours shifts continuously for two weeks, and then they have two 
week vacation. However, this is not a rule, as the amount of people present at the facility may 
change along with phase of development.  
 The well site is covered with concrete slabs and surrounded with heaped 2 meters high 
bund. This is a safety feature that in case of liquid leaking will prevent liquid from dwindle 
away into ground or spill to next properties. On the east side of the facility there were located 
storage pits were the water from the well was stored, but they were not build yet when the 
photo in Figure 3 was taken. Before the installation will be described in detail, one more thing 
should be pointed out, which may have a significant importance later. Looking closer at the 
photo reveals that in the foreground there is a goal and probably a whole football pitch, which 
is not that far from the wellsite. 
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2.3 Main elements of the installation 
 As the risk analysis is focusing on the hazards connected to the surface well testing 
installation, it’s main elements have to be presented. The Figure 4 shows the simplified well 
testing installation based on the actual P&ID on well LE-1 in Strzeszewo (EXPRO, 2013). In 
the next subchapters each of these elements will be described from the functioning and 
hazardous perspective. 
 
Figure 4 Simplified well testing installation. 
 
 
2.3.1 Test tree(flowhead)  
 It is the only connection and safety barrier between production well and the surface 
processing installation. Its name is commonly mistaken with wellhead which is  placed on the 
top of the well during drilling, afterwards the wellhead is switched by the test tree which is a 
collection of different types of valves and spools. The most important function of these valves 
and spools is to prevent hydrocarbons from the well to spread out. The second major function 
of the flowhead is controlling the well upstream flow rate.  Therefore choosing the proper test 
tree is a very important process as it not only has to fit to piping specification, but also handle 
the pressure conditions inside the well. Furthermore such a tree should be equipped with a 
collection of safety cutouts which in case of hazardous situation can immediately close the 
inflow of the hydrocarbons to the installation. These emergency shutdown systems are 
typically hydraulically operated, which means that in case of loss of hydraulic pressure in the 
system the valves are automatically closed(fail safe close). In the Figure 5 the flowhead is 
photographed during the stimulation activities. 
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         Figure 5 Test tree (3Legs Resources, 2015b) 
 The reliability of the test trees is said to be on extremely high level, it means low 
frequency of failure(King, 2010)(HSE, 2002), as its failure in case of blowout is one of the 
biggest threats to the whole facility, not to mention the failure during common operations.  
The blowout may appear any time during operation of the facility even when the production is 
stopped. According to EIA(2004) the historical blowout frequency in gas wells during 
testing/production equals 9,8x10
-5
 per well year. Despite the flowhead and downhole safety 
valves work properly, the overpressure may lead to rupture of every single element of the 
installation, causing a life threatening situation. In the worst case the tree is blown off and the 
hydrocarbons are leaking straight from the well, causing a great fire which cannot be 
extinguished without closing the well. According to EIA(2004) the blowout frequency per 
well  
 
 
2.3.2 Flares 
 In these high vertical stacks, which are commonly associated to hydrocarbons 
exploitation, the gas from installation is burnt. Due to lack of gas storages or gas pipelines the 
gas has to be flared even if it a waste of money and source of carbon dioxide emission. There 
are two types of flares at the facility – high and low pressure. The first one is connected to the 
knock out drum and is constantly operating. The second one is only operating when the 
overpressure or evaporation in the surge tank occurs, however the small flame is always 
burning powered by external source of propane so that in case of overpressure the gas is 
immediately burnt. The flares are not dangerous in themselves but they are a source of 
ignition. So in case of any uncontrolled leak or formation of flammable cloud, it is just a 
matter of time when it ignites, because of continuous work of the flare. 
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2.3.3 Test separator 
 It is the first element of the installation where raw gas is treated and water droplets and 
gasoline is separated. There are many separators with different construction and solutions, but 
most of them are separating liquid phase from gas by flowing gas through a foam catcher, 
where the small droplets of liquid are caught and flown down to the bottom of the separator, 
whereas the initially separated gas is flowing to the next separator. Meanwhile liquid phase is 
separated, due to difference in relative density between water and gasoline, and transported to 
the surge tank. Separators are the next potential threat at the facility as the hydrocarbons 
flowing through them are under high pressure reaching almost 100bar, which means that in 
case of failure the decompressed gas will have tens of times larger volume than inside the 
separator.  
 
Figure 6 Three phase horizontal test separator (Fox Tank Company, 2013) 
 
2.3.4 Methanol tank 
 In order to prevent formation of hydrates inside the installation, methanol has to be 
injected in the installation between the flowhead and the test separator. The dosing is 
performed by a methanol pump which is the connector between the tank and the raw gas pipe.  
The tank is a small spherical vessel where methanol is stored under atmospheric pressure and 
ambient temperature. Although this vessel is not a main element of the installation, the 
methanol which is stored inside is a toxic substance, and any leaks may appear to be 
dangerous. 
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2.3.5 Knock out(K.O.) vessel  
 The second stage separator which is known under several names like flash drum or 
knock out drum. Gas from the first separator is flown to this device for a more thorough 
separation. The functioning of this separator is quite similar to the previous one, as the gas is 
separated by flowing through different types of filters. Hazards connected to this device are 
similar to the first sage separator, although the working pressure is lower, reaching only 5 bars 
in opposite to the volume which is 3m
3
 bigger. Because of the simplicity of this device the 
probability of any kind of failure is about 3 times lower than the first stage separator(OREDA, 
2002).  
 
              Figure 7 K.O. vessel (Wikipedia, 2007)    
 
2.3.6 Surge tank 
 The vessel which have two main functions, firstly it is a protection in case of a sudden 
rise of a pressure inside the installation, as well as the penultimate storage for the liquid 
phase. Originally it was developed as a second stage separator, but with more advanced 
devices developed its functions changed to the mentioned ones(McAleese, 2000). The most 
important parameter of the surge tank during functioning is the level of fluid which is 
monitored by side glasses or high and low level alarms. Also in surge tank the separation is 
present as the gas trapped in the liquid phase is vaporizing and transported to the low pressure 
flare.  
 
 
 
11 
 
2.3.7 Liquid storage 
 The final deposit of the liquid phase from the installation, it is a big pit which is 
surrounded by a bund and lined with impermeable material so that the liquid is not getting 
into the ground. The production of the water from the well could reach almost 80m
3
 per day, 
so the size of the pit is considerable. As the liquid is mainly consisting of water with small 
addition of heavy hydrocarbons it can be stored this way, as it is not a possible source of fire. 
 
 
Figure 8 Storage pits (3Legs Resources, 2015c) 
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3. Gases and fluids 
 The gas treatment is a multistep process, where many substances are added or 
separated from the gas. These gases and fluids are often toxic, flammable or explosive, so 
their processing or storing has to be carefully planned. The important issue of risk analysis is 
to investigate what type of potentially hazardous substances are present at the facility and 
what is their possible negative impact on people and overall safety. In this chapter the most 
dangerous substances will be described. It has to be highlighted that there are more potentially 
hazardous substances used at the facility but their amount is insignificant and they cannot be 
treated as a threat in the scale of the whole installation.  
 
3.1 Methane  
 This simplest alkene is the main component of shale gas, the raw gas can consist over 
90% of this hydrocarbon. The main goal of the whole facility is to produce this gas on the 
industrial scale. The more gas is produced, the bigger success is achieved. Two main factors 
that are influencing the success of the well is size and pressure of the reservoir, which can 
exceed 300 bar. The high pressure and explosive nature of methane are putting enormous 
importance on the safety systems. As for example in case of leakage under such pressure, the 
LEL of 5% is achieved rapidly. Furthermore methane is present in almost every part of 
installation from the separator to the surge tank, when the daily flow rate of 10 000 Nm
3 
is 
added, we have an image of the installation where even a small failure can lead to fatal 
consequences. Especially that it is located in the open air, so the high amount of oxygen is 
available and the flare is constantly burning.  Therefore the level of methane at the facility has 
to be carefully controlled by special detectors as it odourless and humans are not able to smell 
it. A pure methane is not toxic to the humans and is not causing skin or eye damage, however 
it displaces the oxygen and makes breathing difficult, which is a very serious threat(CCOHS, 
2015). Fortunately in this case the only threat is fire or explosion, as the methane is lighter 
than air and due to outdoor installation it will not cumulate, rather just spread to the 
atmosphere. To extinguish methane fire an dry chemical powder or high expansion foam 
should be used.  
 
3.2 Methanol 
 Methanol is the simplest aliphatic alcohol and like most of alcohols it is highly 
flammable and potentially explosive. It is not a product of the separation, it is an additive 
which is injected right after the flowhead to prevent formation of hydrates in the installation. 
Without adding methanol in the pipes the hydrates may appear, causing choking and leading 
to failure of the whole system. The methanol is stored in the spherical storage which volume 
is about 1,5m
3
 in a liquid phase under atmospheric pressure. Typically failure is the leakage 
from the tank, where the methanol is spilling and creating pool which is slowly 
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evaporating(Smith et. al, 2002). Methanol is highly poisonous for humans, even a small 
portion swollen may lead to death. Although it should not be expected that anybody at the 
facility will drink the methanol, it should be expected that they may appear methanol 
vaporous which are strong toxics. Even a small amount of around 500ppm can cause 
discomfort and disabling if the exposure time is over one hour. The danger is growing along 
with higher concentration and exposure time, so for example exposure for 5 minutes in 
atmosphere consisting 40 000ppm of methanol vapours is lethal. Once again relying on the 
smell is not sufficient, as methanol has a typical alcohol odour, but it is impossible to evaluate 
how big is the concentration(Kavet & Nauss, 1990). Moreover methanol vapours are 
explosive, their LEL equals 6%, UEL 36% and auto ignition temperature. 455C. So in case of 
fire at the facility it may be necessary to sprinkle the methanol tank with water to lower the 
temperature and prevent the possible explosion. Next important safety issue is that the 
methanol is heavier than air and it vapours after leakage will cumulate close to the ground 
creating a serious threat to the crew and residents.  
 
3.3 Oil/condensate 
 The raw gas from the well is always consisting alkenes of higher numbers than 
methane. The composition varies in different reservoirs as well in different wells. These 
hydrocarbons are normally in form of liquid condensate or light oil which is separated from 
the gas in the first separator and then in the flush drum. Afterwards it is moved to surge tank 
where it is mixing with water from the reservoir creating emulsion. Finally this emulsion is 
stored in the pit, where it is waiting for the transport to a refinery or other type of water 
treatment facility. It is hard to describe the exact composition of this fluid however in it pure 
form before mixing with water it is dangerous for the safety of people and the installation, as 
the rest of hydrocarbons. It is flammable, often its vapours are explosive and possible spills 
can strongly pollute the environment and water sources. Therefore it is important that the pit, 
facility surface and surrounding bunds are impermeable to assure that any spill will not get 
into the ground.  
 
3.4 Hydrogen sulphide 
 The most dangerous component of raw gas which is known for its rotten eggs odour 
and toxicity. It is so dangerous because the dose of just around 2000ppm is killing 
immediately, the effects of lower doses exposure are presented in Table 1. Due to its highly 
negative effects on humans it was used as a chemical weapon during World War I(Foulkes, 
2001). Moreover, the concentration above 150ppm is paralysing the olfactory sense, which 
can lead to wrong interpretation of effects and improper decisions(PHE, 2009). 
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Concentration [ppm] Effect 
20 – 30 Conjunctivitis 
50 Objection to light after 4 hours exposure, lacrimation 
150 – 200 Objection to light, irritation of mucous membranes, headache 
200 – 400 Slight symptoms of poisoning after several hours 
250 – 600 Pulmonary edema and bronchial pneumonia after prolonged 
exposure 
500 – 1000 Painful eye irritation, vomiting 
1000 Immediate acute poisoning 
1000 – 2000 Lethal after 30 to 60 minutes 
> 2000  Rapidly lethal 
Table 1 Effects of exposure to hydrogen sulphide (HSE, 2014)  
 
 Although in this well during tests the hydrogen sulphide did not appear, its 
appearance, even highly unlikely, cannot be neglected. The hydrogen sulphide blowouts are 
extremely dangerous events with dozens of fatalities, like in China in 2003, where there was a 
blowout in a gas well which contained hydrogen sulphide. As a consequence 243 people were 
killed, 9 thousand were injured and 64 thousand people had to be evacuated. It was during the 
drilling activities, yet blowouts also occurs during well testing(UNEP, 2011). In Poland there 
are dozens of gas wells where hydrogen sulphide is present, but it is not exceeding 1% share 
of the raw gas. These may seems like a small contamination, but this 1% is ten times bigger 
than the instant lethal dose. Moreover there are also several high-sulphur oil wells for 
example in Kamien Pomorski where concentration is reaching almost 12%(Mamczur et al., 
1997). Presence of hydrogen sulphide in raw gas is connected to type of rocks surrounding the 
reservoir. Often it is present in carbonate rocks like limestone or dolomites, whereas it is not 
observed in sandstones. Thus the Polish shale gas which is mostly surrounded by sandstones 
is stated to be free of hydrogen sulphide(San Leon Energy, 2013). However there is never a 
complete certainty that it will not appear somehow as in the United States there are shale gas 
reservoirs where hydrogen sulphide is present(Weiland & Hatcher, 2012). So it is a common 
practice to place special detectors inside the installation to monitor the level of hydrogen 
sulphide. It is forming an explosive mixture with air at concentration from 4% to 46%. Next 
possible hazardous scenario assumes that hydrogen sulphide suddenly appears in the well, but 
the installation is still working normally which means that the gas would be burnt on the flare 
creating a lot of sulphur dioxide. This substance is not only heavier than air but also highly 
toxic and will accumulate close to the ground causing potential threat.  Summing up the 
sudden presence of hydrogen sulphide should be always considered during design phase as 
neglecting this issue may have the most severe consequences from all possible negative 
scenarios. 
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4. Regulations  
 
4.1 Regulations in Poland 
 Shale gas extraction as any other hydrocarbons extraction is regulated in detail by the 
Polish mining law, the violation of which may lead to the withdrawal of concessions or not 
granting it in the first place. Although the first shale gas wells appeared a few years ago, the 
mining law has not changed significantly since then. The only changes were connected to 
additional acts concerning hydraulic fracturing, not the surface issues and it was only created 
after pressure from the society(ODLA, 2015). Therefore in this chapter the facility 
functioning will be analysed on the basis of a common law which is obligatory for all 
hydrocarbon wells.  
 As we know, all phases from drilling, through testing, to the production of 
hydrocarbons are connected to certain degree of risk. This risk is unavoidable, however with 
proper safety measures the risk can be controlled. As the functioning of the facility may have 
a serious impact on the surrounding area including plants, animals and people, the 
standardized safety requirements have to be created. These requirements may vary in different 
countries, but their objective is the same, to assure safety of workers, local residents and 
environment. This is an important issue as without a proper law companies may forget about 
the safety in the pursuit for the profits. A good example of such regulations is the location of 
the well. Often well is not located in the best place from the geological or economical point of 
view but where the setback rules are letting it to be placed. The most important articles 
specifies the setback rules for the gas wells(SMA, 2014): 
 § 44. 1. Well must be located at least: 
1) 50 meters from objects with open fire, exploration drilling activities in search for open, 
with drilling works the purpose of finding, identification of oil and gas or extracting oil and 
gas from reservoirs, as well as in areas with an expected occurrence in subsurface 
accumulations of combustible gases; 
2) The 1,5 height of the rig or mast away from railways, canals, reservoirs, rivers, public 
roads and other buildings, in addition the distance from overhead high-voltage lines is 1.5 
height of the tower or mast, but not less than 30 m. 
§ 45. In the case of locating the well in a forest area or at a distance less than 100 meters 
from the edge of the forest, where the presence of oil or natural gas is expected, the method of 
fire protection forest area  must be agreed with the owner, operator or user. 
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 This means that the distance between the actual objects is important here, not the 
boundaries of the parcel. Furthermore, there is §161 which specified the distance between the 
installation located at the facility connected to hydrocarbon processing. 
§ 161. 1. The distance between any object or installation connected to oil and gas 
exploitation, as well as, (...), gas treatment installation (...) must not be less than 50 meters – 
from public roads, railways, administrative and residential buildings, and other objects with 
open fire not connected to the facility functioning. 
 Clearly there is some contradictions as well can be located 30 meters from other 
objects, but the installation have to be located at least 50 meters. Besides, there is additional 
paragraph § 161. 3. which states that in exceptional case the distance can be reduced after 
permission from the State Mining Authority. It may seem that the mining law in this regard is 
very lenient, that only 50 meters can separate someone's house from the well, but in practice, 
none locates facilities in such close proximity, apart from roads and railroads. It is not 
surprising as developing the facility, especially drilling the well is a very noisy process, and 
the local residents would perhaps strongly protest against it. This would probably result in a 
poor reputation of a company and problems with its further development. In Strzeszewo case 
the distance between the well and the closest building is about 350 meters. 
 When there is probability that in the raw gas may contain hydrogen sulphide or that 
drilling will go through the layers with hydrogen sulphide, the setback regulations are getting 
more severe. 
 
§ 79. 1. For each well: 
1) in which the hydrocarbon reservoir containing hydrogen sulphide will be extracted, the 
category of the hydrogen sulphide hazard is defined as well as the radius of the expected 
hydrogen sulphide contamination in case of the surface eruption; 
§ 80. In areas of a known capacity and the concentration of hydrogen sulphide the radius of 
the contamination zone and the obligatory distance separating the well and other objects is 
determined based on the following criteria: 
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Category of 
risk 
The radius of the 
anticipated 
contamination zone 
H2S [m] 
The minimal distance [m] from the well: 
a single 
residential 
house 
buildings occupied by: 
less than 30 
people 
(jointly) : 
more than 30 
people: 
I > 3500 100 500 1500 
II from 3500 to 1000 100 500 500 
III less  than 1000 to 500 100 100 100 
IV less than 500 to 150 100 100 100 
Table 2 Setback rules in Poland for wells with hydrogen sulphide (SMA, 2014) 
  
 As we can see the setback rules are more restrictive in case of hydrogen sulphide, but 
it is questionable if the distance is long enough, as according to what was mentioned in the 
previous chapter the accidents with hydrogen sulphide are often connected to fatalities and 
other serious consequences. Also it is interesting that a single residential house is treated with 
the same respect no matter what is the level of risk. Moreover the regulations allows that 
occupied building are in range of probable contaminated zone, which with knowledge about 
severity of inhaling hydrogen sulphide even in minimal doses is a risky practice. In next 
paragraph the Polish setback rules will be compared with other international standards. 
 
3.2 Setback rules in United States 
 Abroad, notably in the United States, set back rules are described in greater detail, we 
know this is due to the long period of exploration and  experience arising from that fact. It 
may be reasonable to take them as an example and base for creating the more detailed 
regulations in Poland. This would significantly contribute to the further development of this 
subject instead of coming to the same effect through a few years of trial and error, which can 
be highly dangerous method in this case.  
 The mining law in America is regulated at state level, which means that each state has 
different setback rules. Although the states regulations vary, they are all based on the API 
standards(Richardson et. al, 2013), which contain the practical recommendations for placing 
oil and gas facilities and their influence on overall safety. In the figure there are presented 
minimum setback distances between well and non-facility buildings in feet. 
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Figure 9 Setback distances in United States (Richardson et. al, 2013) 
 
 As the figure shows, the variety is mostly dependent on the states’ population density 
and the level of urbanization, as for example Pennsylvania and Colorado are relatively 
urbanized states comparing to others and their setback is set to as much as 500 feet. Although 
it is hard to explain why the setback in North Dakota is also set to 500 feet, whereas its 
population density is one of the smallest in United States. It may be connected to the phrase in 
API standard which states:  
“when feasible, the well site and access road should be located as far as practical from 
occupied structures and places of assembly.” (API, 2011) 
 This phrase “as far as practical” and its interpretation is probably the cause of the 
differences in setback. This is potentially dangerous situation where such respected standards 
as API are not giving a clear answer what is the minimal setback. It can be also highlighted 
that these regulations are not always obeyed, as the neighbouring landowners to the facility 
may let the well to be drilled closer than the setback distance is. Also the interpretation of the 
rules varies, some of the minimum setback is concerning only important buildings like 
schools hospitals or churches and others concerns all objects build by human. Not only wells 
location is described, many states like Ohio have rules concerning gas treatment locations(300 
feet) or storage pits in New Mexico(1000 feet). 
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3.3. Setback rules worldwide 
 In other European countries the setback rules are set rather on the case-by-case basis 
like in United Kingdom(DE&CC, 2014), which in my opinion is a good practice only when 
the people which are responsible for the case are experts and are conscious of the threats that 
such a facility is creating. Nevertheless the Scottish Government, which  has announced plans 
to set a minimum distance between sites and populated areas (DE&CC, 2014). 
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5. PHAST description 
 
5.1 PHAST 
 
 To perform reliable quantitative risk assessment the comprehensive software to 
calculate probabilities and consequences is needed. PHAST (Process Hazard Analysis 
Software Tool) is one of these programs. It was developed in 1990s by DNV to model risk 
and consequences of various events connected to gas and fluids dispersions as well as 
explosions. The greatest advantage over other tools is its simplicity, in a relatively short time 
the accurate analysis could be performed with respect to international safety standards. On the 
other hand its advantage is also disadvantage as its simplicity makes it hard to calculate very 
accurate dispersions which may be needed when placing gas detectors.  Therefore it is mostly 
used to model consequences at big facilities like: refineries, chemical plants or oil rigs. 
 PHAST to model the dispersions of the fluids and gases is using the Unified 
Dispersion Model which was created by British Association(DNV, 2006). It can describe the 
behaviour of simple gases to complicated mixtures in terms of various scenarios from jet 
dispersion to pool fires. The whole method is relying on Gaussian Puff model, which was 
tested and verified to become reliable risk analysis tool. 
 However PHAST has been tested and verified it is still a simple programme which is 
not able to simulate the real world behaviour. It is relying on mathematical formulas which 
are using many constant values which in fact may vary. For example there have been 
performed study proving that only one parameter, which is the angle of dispersion of a 
leaking gas from the hole has a significant influence on the results of the analysis(Pandya, 
Gabas & Marsden, 2011). Therefore it must be always remembered that relying too much on 
the quantitative risk assessment tools is connected with certain dose of uncertainty and could 
lead to severe consequences.  
 
5.2 Influential Factors 
 As modelling the fluid mechanics is very complex issue, it must consider many factors 
in the calculations. These factors can be divided in many groups like internal and external or 
constant and variable. For example the volume of the separator is always the same, but the 
pressure inside may vary, depending on the flowhead pressure, production phase or any other 
reason. Further, the parameters of installation can be assessed with a great dose of certainty, 
but the assessing the external influencing factors is much harder. Thus, the statistics have to 
be used. They are not a perfect and infallible tool, but using statistics is much more reliable 
than relying only on experience or superstition. There is possibility that properly used 
statistics may reveal some information which are not visible at first sight and support the risk 
assessment with an invaluable aid.  
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5.2.1 Stability classes 
 One of the most important influential factors is the weather. It is not only determining 
the design of the installation, but it has significant influence on the effects of the failure. It 
may reduce the negative consequences or speed them dramatically. A simple example, there is 
hydrogen sulphide blowout at the facility which is located close to the village, the direction 
and speed of the wind may err on whether the residents will survive or not. Not only wind is 
influencing the dispersion of gases, but also the stability classes, which are quantising 
tendency of a parcel of air to move upward or downward after it has been displaced vertically 
by a small amount (Woodward, 1998)  
 In 1961 Frank Pasquill was the first to standardize the weather stability classes, he 
created the six level scale from A to F categorizing the amount of atmospheric 
turbulence(Pasquill, 1961). This scale is well-known worldwide and probably the most 
popular one, as it has a perfect balance between simplicity and level of details. The Table 3  
presents the name of each level, and in the Table 4 there are requirements for choosing the 
proper stability class for given conditions.  
.  
Stability class Definition 
A Very unstable 
B Unstable 
C Slightly unstable 
D Neutral 
E Slightly stable 
F Stable 
Table 3 Definition of stability classes  
Surface wind 
speed 
Daytime incoming solar radiation Night time cloud cover 
m/s Strong Moderate Slight 50% < 50% > 
2 > A A - B B E F 
2 – 3 A - B B C E F 
3 – 5 B B – C C D E 
5 – 6 C C – D D D D 
6  < C D D D D 
Table 4 Stability classes requirements 
 The process of choosing the right class is greatly influencing the results of the QRA, 
as the more unstable the surrounding is, the greater hazardous zone becomes. The stability 
class of the region where the facility is located is between C and D, so because of safety 
consideration and conservative approach it was set in simulations to level C. 
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5.2.2 Wind  
 Further the average wind direction and its force have to be found. It is not only useful 
for placing the gas detector(Bafjord, 2011), but also it is important for the layout of the 
facility as well as it placing in configuration with living area. As Strzeszewo is a very small 
village there are no weather historical data, fortunately there is only 20km to Łeba where the 
weather station has been working for many years and the data is available. The error in 
approximation the weather data from Łeba to Strzeszewo is negligible as both of this places 
are lying on the same ground level and the distance from the seaside of Strzeszewo is less 
than 10km in straight line and the weather station in Łeba is not placed directly on the beach.  
 The Table 5 presents the historical average wind speed in Łeba and the data 
availability. As a result the average wind speed is 16,6 km/h and average availability equals 
nearly 96%. For the purpose of this work the availability is high enough, especially if we 
consider that it was gathered for 18 years, from January 1996 to December 2014. In Table 6 
there are values of average wind speed from a different source, their similarity to the first 
source are proving that the accuracy of the measurement is sufficient. 
 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
Speed 
[km/h] 
19,2 19,3 17,7 15,8 15,4 16,6 15,1 14,7 14,9 16,3 16,1 17,8 
Data 
availability 
[%] 
95 94 94 94 94 94 94 95 99 99 99 99 
Table 5 Historical average wind speed (WeatherOnline, 2015) 
 
 
Month of year 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Year 
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 1-12 
Dominant wind 
direction 
SW WSW W NE NE W W W W SW SW SSW W 
Wind probability 
>= 5 m/s [%] 
39 37 46 39 39 42 40 37 36 35 33 39 38 
Average wind speed 
[m/s] 
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 6 5 
Table 6 Historical wind statistics (WindFinder, 2015) 
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 Not only the wind speed is important, but also its direction. The weather in northern 
Poland is greatly influenced by the Gulf Stream, in consequence the wind is blowing mostly 
from the western directions. Figure 10 presents the distribution of wind direct ions in 
percentages based on the statistical data from WindFinder(2015). The wind direction 
distribution is an important factor during the location analysis of the high-risk facilities, which 
are using toxic gases and fluids. The probability says that it is safer to locate the facilities 
downwind from the residential areas, however it is only probability and nothing guarantees 
that during the real leakage the wind will not be blowing directly towards the residential area. 
The facility in Strzeszewo is placed on the worst possible location, on the east side of the 
village, which means that most of the time the leaked substances will disperse directly to 
Strzeszewo. It cannot be said that someone made a mistake locating the wellsite there, 
especially if we consider that it is not a wooden shed, but a high risk facility which is worth 
millions of dollars. Probably the wind direction was neglected during the location choosing as 
there are many other more important factors that are influencing the final location. It can be 
assumed that the company is fully conscious about the threat, but it is confident about its 
safety solutions and wind direction is not a factor. 
  
Figure 10 Wind direction distribution in percentages (WindFinder, 2015) 
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6. Risk analysis methods 
 There are many risk analysis or assessment methods, but none of them is perfect. Each 
method has some advantages and disadvantages, which have to be taken into consideration, 
when choosing the right method. It is an important aspect of the work organisation, as the 
chosen methodology will guide the whole process of risk assessment. The choosing should 
start from defining the objective, scope and limitations of the assessment and then the most 
suitable method can be assigned. The correct method is the one that takes into account all 
possible risks and results, which are in the scope of assessment and is suitable for the amount 
of the data possessed. Sometimes one method is not enough, as it is not covering all necessary 
issue, thus other complementary methods have to be used to fulfil the initial requirements.  
 In the collection of different methods, the two main approaches can be indentified the 
qualitative and the quantitative ones. The first approach is describing the risk using 
statements(e.g. low, moderate, high), whereas the quantitative is using defined values. In this 
thesis both of this methods will be used, to ensure that the risk assessment identified and 
assessed most of the possible negative consequences of facility functioning thoroughly.   
 
6.1 SWIFT analysis 
 As the Structured What-If Technique will be used in the next chapter, it is important to 
discuss the pros and cons of this approach. SWIFT is the qualitative risk assessment which 
analysis the risk by asking the question “what if?” something happen and what are the 
consequences of this event. The analysis is made by a team, preferably multidisciplinary, in a 
form of a brainstorming discussion, where everyone is trying to identify different sources of 
risk and associated consequences (Kritzinger, 2006). The optimal number of team members is 
6-10, as too small number may not possess enough necessary knowledge, and too big may 
have problems with too broad discussions (OMV, 2013). This technique was developed as an 
alternative to a technique called HAZOP, as it is less detailed which means it can be done 
faster and cheaper. It was developed for the chemical and petrochemical plants, but now it is 
widely used in other disciplines due to its structured form and ease of use. Also it is a useful 
tool for analysing the domino effect events, which are a great threat at all high-risk facilities. 
However there is a new approach to analyse the domino effect events using   
 
 The main pros of the SWIFT are (ISO/IEC, 2009): 
- Variable forms of application, from physical plants and systems to organisations and 
activities; 
- Relatively small preparation effort by the team, which gives a possibility to involve in 
the assessment a lot of multidisciplinary specialists, as well as, people who are 
responsible for the existing systems; 
- Simplicity and rapidness of the process, the major hazards and risks quickly identified; 
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- System oriented approach, which gives participants possibility to model the systems’ 
behaviour on the basis of different scenarios; 
- Creating risk register and its treatment is relatively effortless comparing to other 
techniques; 
- It can be used to identify risks and hazards that can be taken forward into a 
quantitative study; 
- Improvement of systems and processes can be based on the recommendation included 
in SWIFT. 
 
The cons of the SWIFT (ISO/IEC, 2009): 
- The efficiency of the SWIFT is very dependable on the experience and abilities of the 
facilitator; 
- Without proper preparation, it can be a very time-consuming process; 
- If the experiences and knowledge of the team is not covering all the aspects of the 
analysis, some risks or hazards may not be identified; 
- If the technique is used on too high level it may fail to identify complex, detailed or 
correlated causes.  
 
6.2 QRA 
 QRA is a formalised and standardized form of analysing the potentially hazardous 
events estimating the likelihood and consequences of those events, and expressing the results 
as risk to people, the environment or the business(DNV, 2013). To perform such an analysis a 
specialized software is often necessary, which can calculate and model all the events and their 
consequences. A good software is characterized by ability to input all the data acquired so that 
everything what is known about given event is taken into consideration. The result of such an 
assessment is a detailed risk picture with all possible consequences presented in a real 
numbers or countable values. QRA is often an essential element of application form for 
acquiring concession from the government for some high-risk systems like power plants, 
bridges or petrochemical facilities. Without estimating the risk in countable values and 
modelling the possible consequences to surrounding area the concession are not granted. QRA 
can be used on different levels of details, it means that the software can be used to model the 
functioning of a single valve or the whole facility, it only depends on choosing the right 
software and adjusting it to the needs. Moreover, if the right software is used, there is 
possibility to repeatedly update the assessment with new safety barriers or solutions and 
observe how the risk picture changes. It is very effective tool especially during designing 
ALARP safety systems. According to Kardell & Lööf(2014) QRA can also be used to analyse 
the domino effect scenarios, although it is connected to a great degree of uncertainty.  
 One of the biggest disadvantages of QRA is it time and money consumption, to make 
a reliable QRA a lot of information have to be gathered and sometimes a special software has 
to be designed to fit to the requirements of the QRA. That is why this type of assessment is 
used only when it is really necessary and before it is performed the detailed boundaries of 
analysis are set, to assure that the analysis will not grow infinitely. There are 
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studies(Abrahamsson, 2002) that proved that lack of QRA standardization is leading to 
insufficient reliability of the QRA results, which resulted in the situation where several teams 
had been asked to perform the QRA of the same facility and the variations between their 
results were unacceptable.   
 In this thesis there will be used a QRA software called PHAST which will be used to 
model the consequences of failures at the installation and potential threats to people living 
nearby. It will concentrate mainly on their safety, so that the economic and environmental 
hazards will be disregarded.  
 
6.3 Uncertainty 
 One of the most important part of any risk assessment is describing its uncertainties, 
which according to NORSOK Z-013 standard (NORSOK, 2010) is an essential requirement to 
validate the analysis. The importance of assessing the uncertainty is connected to lack of full 
confidence that the assessment has taken into consideration all the events. Also the 
consequences that were assigned to each event may not happen, or the failure will happened 
in unplanned and surprising way. These QRAs are just a simulations, and unfortunately the 
real life scenarios are sometimes completely different from what was planned or predicted.  
 As there uncertainty is a very broad concept, according to Parry(1998) we can identify 
three classes of uncertainty causes – parameter, model and completeness uncertainty. This 
definition is not taking into account all the uncertainty causes, which are necessary to identify, 
to make the analysis more reliable. Hence, according to Armacosta & Pet-Edwards(1999) and 
Zimmermann(2000) we can indentify not three , but six major causes of uncertainty: 
- Lack of information(or knowledge) – the most common cause of uncertainty is lack of 
necessary knowledge, data or information, which lack is displaced by approximations. 
It can be both qualitative(when the analyst possess the accurate data to describe some 
event but does not know whether it is safe or hazardous/good or bad) or 
quantitative(when the analyst knows that there is probability of an event but does not 
the exact value of it). In this thesis, this type uncertainty has a strong influence on the 
final results. Due to small amount of information about the installation, significant part 
of data was taken from other sources or approximated, however it must be highlighted 
that all approximation in this thesis are very conservative, so that the final risk picture 
is higher than it would be with standard approximations. 
- Abundance of information – second cause is connected to excess of information, when 
there is so much data that human is incapable of identifying the most important one 
and neglects it which makes the final risk picture incomplete. This type of uncertainty 
is not connected to this thesis as the amount of information was rather insufficient. 
- Conflict of different pieces of data – situation when there is data that is contradicting 
with the other one. This may happen when the data is taken from different sources  
which may be not relevant to the given scenario. There are two ways to decrease this 
cause, to gather more data or to eliminate the irrelevant option. However both of this 
27 
 
option have significant disadvantages, firstly additional data may still be contradictive, 
secondly the right option may be eliminated. This cause of uncertainty was not present 
on any stage of this analysis. 
- Measurements errors – risk assessments greatly relies on measured data, which can 
never be said to be completely accurate. There is always some dose of probability that 
the measuring instrument was not accurate or the measuring human made a mistake. It 
is hard to judge how big is this uncertainty in this thesis as I was not personally 
involved in any measurement that was used in this thesis. However the data that the 
thesis is relying on was taken from reliable sources such as for example OREDA. 
- Linguistic ambiguity – many people which are not familiar with other languages may 
have problems to identify the context or the true meaning of many words or 
statements, especially in qualitative assessments which may influence the risk picture. 
This cause is not relevant to my analysis 
- Subjectivity of analyst opinions – when the analysis are performed by single person or 
small teams which have similar opinions/knowledge, there is a chance that the risk 
picture will be inaccurate. This cause is the most relevant to my thesis as I was doing 
it on my own, but I tried to reduce this uncertainty by validating my work by other 
people who are working daily as risk analysts. 
  
 These were the major causes of uncertainty in risk analysis, which are existing on a 
certain level in every risk assessment. It is important to be conscious about their existence and 
what is their level as it is a base for the risk informed decisions making.    
  
The uncertainties have different causes, as well as, different types (Zio & Pedroni, 2012): 
- Aleatory uncertainties – these types of uncertainty is mostly connected to reliability 
analysis when the failure rate is defined by some probabilistic model(e.g. Poisson, 
binomial distributions). Although these models try to present the probabilistic picture 
of when the failure will occur it is not telling when exactly it will happen. For example 
in this thesis the important factor is failure rate of Christmas tree which is said to 
happen once in 300 years, but because of aleatory uncertainty it may also happen 
twice in one year. This type of uncertainty is irreducible. 
- Epistemic uncertainty -  this one is connected to lack of information about analysed 
phenomena which are divided for model and  parameters uncertainties. It means that 
all the influential factors were not taken into account or information about their 
influence was not detailed enough. This type of uncertainty can be reduced by 
gathering more and more data, but this process can be endless especially in the open 
world when the number of possible events is infinite. In this thesis the data has been 
acquired as long as I was subjectively assured that the analysis would be reliable 
enough. 
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 In many cases the robustness of the QRA will as important as its results. It gives the 
decision maker an information about how dependent decisions are on assumptions made in 
the QRA. It must be highlighted that describing the level of uncertainty even if it is high is not 
weakening the results of the analysis. Moreover, identifying key sources of uncertainty can 
help  prioritise resources where they matter most in terms of influence on risk. By addressing 
the uncertainty from an early stage in the QRA process, there is an opportunity to perform 
further studies or implement measures in order to take the uncertainty into account (DNV, 
2015). 
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7.1 SWIFT results 
 As it was mentioned before the risk analysis will begin with Structured What-If 
Template. Normally such an analysis is performed in multi-disciplinary teams, workshops or 
other types of working group, unfortunately in this case it did not happen. Not only there was 
no possibility to contact people responsible for the design and running the facility in 
Strzeszewo, but also the requirements of the master thesis were limiting the enhanced group 
work. Nevertheless I tried to perform this assessment is the most objective way possible with 
regarding to OMV recommendations for the proper application of SWIFT (OMV, 2013). 
 Firstly, the events which may be hazardous were established, obviously the selection 
of events focused on the overall facility level, so the minor failures were neglected. Some of 
the chosen events may seem rather impossible or even hard to imagine, but the risk 
assessment analysis, especially qualitative should include them. A simple identification of 
possible black swans does not necessarily lead to finding the solution for avoiding the risk, 
but may just help to realize that there is such a possibility. For example the terrorist attack on 
the installation in Poland is highly improbable, but it is unknown if there is somebody who 
will get an idea on performing this action. In this case should the crew be trained in personal 
defence or full time armed? Definitely not, but a short training on how to act, what to do, what 
surely not to do or who should be phoned immediately, in such a situation may be a life 
saving activity.   
 Further, the possible negative consequences were assigned to each event. As single 
event may result in several different consequences only the most important were allocated. 
Next, the severity and probability scales were created, they are presented in the table 3. 
Level of probability Frequency once per [years] 
Unlikely 100< 
Remote 10 – 100  
Quite possible 1 – 10 
Possible <1 
Table 7 Level of probability description 
  
Level of severity Consequences 
Critical Fatalities  
Degraded Severe injuries 
Incipient Minor injuries  
Table 8 Level of severity description 
 Since, the classification of each event on the probability and severity scale is the 
process where the opinions in working teams are varying the most, I could not rely only on 
my own, probably objective, point of view. Hence, I asked four people, who has been 
working within petroleum industry or have a daily contact to similar installations to categorize 
each event. To increase the level of objectivism, each person get a blank template and assess 
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the probability and severity on their own. The final levels are simple averages of their 
answers. 
What if? Consequence Likelihood Consequences 
Failure of 
sensors/abnormal 
readings 
Bad interpretation of 
current situation and 
possible bad decisions 
possible degraded 
Corrosion - different 
types 
Walls cracking possible incipient 
Formation of hydrates 
Choking/plugging of 
pipes/inflows/outflows 
possible incipient 
Formation of paraffin 
Choking/plugging of 
pipes/inflows/outflows 
possible incipient 
Leaking from seals 
Leaking of process 
medium 
possible incipient 
Sand abrasion Walls cracking possible incipient 
    
Vibration of welds Softening of welds quite possible degraded 
Leak at cleaning valve 
Leaking of process 
medium 
quite possible incipient 
Not properly tighten 
pipes 
Leaking of process 
medium 
quite possible incipient 
    
Fire at the facility Overpressure in tanks remote critical 
Too high wellhead 
pressure 
Too high load for 
installation 
remote critical 
Accumulation of fluid 
or gas between pipe 
and isolation 
Leaking of the process 
medium 
remote degraded 
Leaving some objects 
inside installation 
Choking/plugging of 
pipes/inflows/outflows 
remote degraded 
Failure of orifice 
Overpressure in the 
installation 
remote degraded 
Failure of downhole 
orifice 
Sudden rise of the 
pressure 
remote degraded 
Manual valves not 
tighten properly 
Leaking of the process 
medium/unwanted flow 
of fluids 
remote incipient 
Extreme weather 
condition/extremely 
cold 
Choking/plugging of 
pipes/inflows/outflows 
remote incipient 
Leaking from paker 
Leaking of the process 
medium 
remote incipient 
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Appearance of 
hydrogen sulphide 
Highly dangerous 
poisoning of people 
unlikely critical 
Terrorist attack 
Possible detonation of the 
installation 
unlikely critical 
Too soft wellhead Threat of disintegration unlikely critical 
Badly installed 
wellhead 
Threat of disintegration unlikely critical 
Failure of wedge gate 
valve 
Overpressure in 
installation 
unlikely critical 
Shut down valve 
failure 
Overpressure in tanks unlikely critical 
Mechanical fracture 
Sudden rupture or leaking 
from the installation 
unlikely degraded 
Badly designed 
installation 
Lower efficiency, lower 
safety 
unlikely degraded 
Badly 
constructed/assembled 
installation 
Leaking of process 
medium/possible 
unlikely degraded 
Table 9 Structured What-If Template 
 The presented template is missing two elements, which are included in the standard 
SWIFT, these are environmental and economic consequences, as well as, recommendations. 
Firstly the aim of the thesis is not to evaluate the level of economic losses and effects on 
downtime and functioning of the facility, as it is not influencing the safety of residents. The 
environmental consequences were also not in the scope of the analysis, but most of them are 
connected to underground activities and failures. Finally the recommendations were not 
included as the detailed information about existing safety systems and solutions at the facility 
were unavailable. Thus, there was no point in creating any safety recommendations which 
may have been already realized. 
 This crude analysis has showed that there are many threats and risks associated with 
well testing installation, however most of them are not relatively danger. The one that are the 
most common have incipient consequences, whereas those that have critical consequences are 
very unlikely to happen. As we can see most of the events will result in leaking of process 
medium, which can lead to appearance of  flammable cloud and sudden rupture. In the next 
chapter the consequences of such leaking and ruptures will be modelled. Further, in the 
discussion chapter, the detailed SWIFT interpretation and analysis will be performed with 
regarding to the overall picture. 
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8. QRA results 
 In the qualitative analysis the major threats have been identified. Even a crude analysis 
of the template shows that all sorts of tanks and vessels are the sources of potential fires or 
explosions, including the well safety systems. Therefore, five elements of the installation were 
chosen for the quantitative analysis. These are: flowhead, test separator, flush drum, surge 
tank and methanol tank. In the Table 10 there are presented the main parameters of these 
elements which were used for the simulation. To simplify the simulation, values are constant 
throughout the whole simulation, whereas in the real world they are changing continuously. 
The volume values are taken from the existing installation, and the volume of the flowhead 
was assumed to be infinite for the purpose of the simulation. This is caused by the pressure 
and volume of the reservoir, which in case of uncontrolled blowout and complete rupture of 
the flowhead will produce the raw gas in such an amount that even after hour the pressure 
does not drop significantly. The pressure values are set to the maximal working pressures that 
were assumed in the P&ID. The temperature is set in the middle of the assumed working 
ranges in the P&ID. The content of the surge tank is assumed to be nonane, normally it would 
be a water with additions of some light liquid hydrocarbons, but to follow the conservative 
approach of the thesis, the nonane was chosen. The methanol tank is filled with pure methanol 
and the rest of the elements is assumed to be filled with pure methane as the influence of  
additional substances of the raw gas is negligible for the results. The probability of the 
flowhead was taken from RADD(2010a), the rest of the probabilities were taken from 
OREDA(2002). However according to RADD(2010b), the probability of failure frequency 
cannot be taken ad hoc, as this data is based on the historical knowledge and is not 
considering the trends over time and improvement of technology. So the experienced analysts 
with proper background knowledge may be able to modify the probability values to better 
imitate the real ones. In this thesis the failure frequencies are taken without modifications. 
 
 Volume [m3] Pressure [psi] Temperature [F] Contains Probability 
Separator 2 1440 130 Methane 0,2525 
Flush drum 5 72,5 120 Methane 0,0974 
Surge tank 16 150 110 Nonane 0,0832 
Methanol tank 2,4 Atmospheric Ambient Methanol 0,2534 
Flowhead infinite 4 351 158 Methane 7,8e-5 
Table 10 Parameters of installation 
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 The first simulations revealed that the leaking of these elements of the installation or 
minor failures would have negligible influence on the safety of residents living nearby. Only 
people located near the installation, like operating personnel would be exposed to the 
consequences of failure. Therefore the most severe conditions and improbable as well were 
simulated, whereas complete rupture of each element is simulated both individually and 
collectively. The PHAST offers so many different graphs and functions that it would be 
impossible to present them all in this thesis, hence only the most important were selected. 
Moreover, the explosion effects were not simulated as the possibility of such an event is 
relatively small, as the simplicity and outdoor location of the installation facilitates the 
ventilation and prevents gas to concentrate. Finally, the results of this QRA should not be 
solely used to draw conclusions, as QRA always has to be based on a certain background 
knowledge (many assumptions and suppositions). Hence, QRA will not be able to reflect all 
uncertainties(Mirzaee, 2012). 
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8.1 K.O. vessel 
 
Figure 11 Function of centreline concentration and downwind distance for the K.O. vessel rupture 
 Figure 11 shows the function of centreline concentration  and downwind distance from 
the K.O. vessel after 18,75s, this value is the flammable averaging time and will be used for 
all the underneath concentration graphs. This value was proposed by Wilson (1995), who 
stated that if the concentration is not exceeding LEL after than 18,75s, then it will not ignite at 
all. The maximal concentration of 90 000ppm is achieved at about 2 meters downwind. The 
explosive atmosphere is achieved when the concentration is in the range of 50 000ppm to 
150 000ppm, which means that from 1,5m upwind to 5m downwind such an atmosphere 
exists. However the explosion is rather connected to leaking scenarios and the ruptures are 
resulting in the fires, thus the fireball scenarios was simulated. The toxicity of methane which 
causes problems with breathing is at about 10 000ppm, which sets the toxic zone between 5-
10m depending on the wind direction.  
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Figure 12 Function of radiation and downwind distance for a fireball after the K.O. vessel rupture 
 Figure 12 shows the function of radiation versus distance downwind in case of fireball. 
The appearance of fireball is connected not only to flames but also to heat, which is calculated 
in watts per square meter(W/m
2
). In Table 11 there are presented values of radiation and its 
effects on humans. As a consequence, the zone where the first injuries may appear is less than 
40m.  
Thermal 
radiation kW/m
2
 
Effect 
1.2 Received from the sun at noon in summer 
2 Minimum to cause pain after 1 minute 
Less than 5 Will cause pain in 15-20 seconds and injury after 30 seconds exposure 
Greater than 6 Pain within approximately 10 seconds rapid escape only is possible 
12.5 
Significant chance of fatality for medium duration exposure. 
* Thin steel with insulation on the side away from the fire may reach 
thermal stress level high enough to cause structural failure 
25 
* Likely fatality for extended exposure and significant chance of fatality 
for instantaneous exposure. 
* Spontaneous ignition of wood after long exposure. 
* Unprotected steel will reach thermal stress temperatures that can cause 
failure. 
35 
* Cellulosic material will pilot ignite within one minute’s exposure. 
* Significant chance of fatality for people exposed instantaneously. 
Table 11 Effects of thermal radiation on humans (HSE, 2014) 
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8.2 Methanol tank 
 
Figure 13 Function of thermal radiation and distance for the pool fire after methanol tank rupture 
 Figure 13 shows the function of thermal intensity radiation for the late pool fire in case 
of the full methanol tank rupture, the three circles show the intensity respectively – 
4kW/m
2
(green), 12,5kW/m
2
(yellow), 35kW/m
2
(blue). We can see that the wind is playing an 
important role in case of fire as the difference between upwind and downwind border of the 
4kW/m
2
 zone is almost 15m. Moreover the green circle is marking the zone where the 
exposure for longer than 30s in normal uniform is dangerous. The simulation did not take into 
account any bunds which are made for the safety purpose or other elements of the installation. 
If the bunds were included the shape of the pool would change along with thermal radius 
zones, probably decreasing the negative effects as the surface of the pool would be smaller, so 
as the evaporation. In this simulation the maximal radius of the pool after the rupture reached 
11m after 23s, afterwards it started to decrease, the mass evaporation averaged 800kg per 
hour.  
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Figure 14 Function of concentration footprint and distance for the methanol tank rupture 
 Figure 14 shows the concentration footprints after the methanol tank rupture. The 
three circles shows the concentration respectively – 36 500ppm(blue), 73 000ppm(yellow) 
and 360 000ppm(red). The shape of the red circle is a consequence of evaporation right above 
the pool, whereas the yellow and blue ones are showing how the methanol vapours spread 
with the wind. The difference between upwind and downwind zone borders is bigger than in 
case of thermal radiation as the wind has a bigger influence on the dispersion of gases then 
fluids. According to Kavet & Nauss(1990) 40 000ppm concentration for 5 minutes is a lethal 
dose, so it can be assumed that the blue circle is showing the lethal zone for the humans 
without oxygen mask in case of the rupture.  
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8.3 Separator 
 
Figure 15 Function of methane’s centreline concentration and distance for a rupture of the separator 
 Figure 15 shows the function of centreline concentration of methane and distance after 
the rupture of the separator after 18,75s. The maximal concentration of 90 000ppm is 
achieved at about 3 meters downwind. The explosive atmosphere is expected to be in the 
range 5m upwind and 9m downwind. The toxic zone(first symptoms of breathing problems) is 
between 10-15m depending on the wind direction. Furthermore, there is similarity between 
Figure 15 and 11, on both of these graphs the maximal concentration reaches about 
90 000ppm, although the separator and K.O. vessel have different size and inside pressure. 
This can be caused by the volatility of methane, which accelerates the mixing of methane with 
air, preventing the accumulation of methane in high concentration clouds. 
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Figure 16 Function of radiation and downwind distance for a fireball after rupture of the separator 
 Figure 16 shows the function of radiation and distance downwind for the fireball in 
case of ignition of methane after the rupture. According to Table 11 the probable instant lethal 
zone is in the range of 40m downwind from the separator and the “pain” zone is starting at 
about 115m from the separator. It should be underlined that this radiation will take only for a 
few seconds as it is a fireball case, not a constant fire. This is caused by lack of continuous 
inflow of fuel(methane). The amount of fuel is limited by the volume of the separator and the 
inside pressure. 
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8.4 Surge tank 
 
Figure 17 Function of thermal radiation and distance for the pool fire after the surge tank rupture  
 Figure 17 shows the function of thermal radiation intensity and distance for the pool 
fire of nonane spilled after rupture of the surge tank. The two circles show the intensity 
respectively – 4kW/m2(green), 12,5kW/m2(yellow). Once more it can be noticed that the 
zones are greatly depending on the wind direction, the green zone is reaching 100m 
downwind and only 25m upwind. The late pool fire is a different scenario than fireball for the 
ruptures of separators, the fuel in this case is delivered for longer time, which means that 
humans located in the range of green zone when the pool ignites should immediately escape 
in the opposite direction to the pool fire. However if we are surprised by the fire on the 
downwind side of the surge tank it may be safer to escape perpendicularly to the wind 
direction as this way the radiation intensity is decreasing faster. Hence, at many facilities the 
windsocks are located to facilitate choosing of the escape route. 
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Figure 18 Function of concentration footprint and distance for the surge tank rupture 
 Figure 18 the concentration footprints after the surge tank rupture. The three circles 
shows the concentration of the nonane vapours respectively – 3 500ppm(green), 
7 000ppm(yellow) and 56 000ppm(red). The shape of the circles is not overlapping with the 
thermal radiation as these two graphs are describing two states of thee pool, ignited and not 
ignited. Also here the shape of the concentrations zones is round because of assumption of 
idealized creation of the nonane pool. If any bunds were included the shape would also 
change. The LEL for nonane is 8 000ppm and UEL equals 29 000ppm, thus the explosive 
atmosphere should be expected in the zone between red and yellow circles. The threshold 
limit value, at which worker can work daily, for nonane vapours equals 200ppm(CDC, 2011). 
However it should be again highlighted that in real conditions the surge tank would not be 
filled with pure nonane, but a mixture of water and other lighter and heavier hydrocarbons. 
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8.5 Well 
 
Figure 19 Function of methane cloud height and downwind distance for the flowhead rupture 
 Figure 19 shows the side view of the methane cloud after flowhead rupture. The three 
domed shapes show the concentration of methane in the atmosphere after 18,75s respectively 
– 22 000ppm(blue), 44 000ppm(yellow) and 165 000ppm(red). It can be argued whether in 
this case the value of 18,75s is correct as raw gas is going to flow from the well unstopped 
until the reservoir presser equals atmospheric one, which can be calculated in days. 
Fortunately for safety issues the methane is lighter than air, and the outlet of the well is 
directed upright, so theoretically released methane will float to higher levels of atmosphere. 
However, in the real conditions the outlet could be directed in other directions or due to Joule-
Thomson effect the cooled methane will be heavier than air. Finally raw gas may not disperse 
at all due to immediate ignition.   
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8.6 Risk contours 
 
Figure 20 Risk contours 
 Figure 20 shows the risk contours, which are created basing on the probability and 
severity of all the ruptures. A cursory analysis indicates that the pink circle(1e-5 a year) is 
outside the wellsite and the risk zones with lower probability are almost overlapping with the 
pink one. Further, the next distinctive zone is the red one(1e-3 a year), which is ending at the 
parcel’s boundaries, the smallest yellow zone(1e-2 a year) with the highest probability of risk 
is just around the installation not even reaching the magazines and offices. According to UK 
HSE standards the tiers for individual risk are(DNV Software, 2001): 
- Maximum tolerable risk for workers: 10-3 per year; 
- Maximum tolerable risk for members of the public: 10-4 per year; 
- Negligible risk: 10-6 per year. 
This means that the tolerable risk contours for the members of the public are not 
exceeding the wellsite boundaries, however, the area closest to the installation is overreaching 
the tolerable risk for the workers. This can be caused by the conservative approach of the 
thesis and too high probabilities of the failures. Also including safety measurements used at 
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the wellsite could decreased the risk levels to the required values. Nevertheless the risk 
contours proved that neither workers’ living quarters, nor Strzeszewo are exposed to the 
hazards concerning failure of the installation. But it must be underlined that the results of such 
an analysis should never be the only basis for decision making, but rather contribute to 
making risk-informed decision (Apostolakis, 2004) 
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9. Discussion 
 The aim of the thesis was to investigate if there are any threats connected with the 
shale gas well testing installation functioning. The analysis showed that the installation is not 
flawless and many hazardous situations can occur. In the most severe cases they may even 
end up with fatalities. This statement is supported by the results of both SWIFT and QRA. 
Even though both of these assessments have shortcomings and different type of uncertainties 
were influencing the results, it cannot be denied that well testing installation are potentially 
dangerous not only to the operating personnel, but also to the people living nearby. 
 The analysis has begun with SWIFT which due to its simplicity and limitation to the 
overall facility level did not include all possible hazardous events. This minor events, like 
pipes leaking or valves choking, were not included  because of their negligible effect on the 
whole facility if they happen alone. However, these single events may arise to serious threat if 
they are connected with other failures occurring parallel or sequentially. It is impossible to 
identify all such events as the only limitation here is imagination and number of combinations 
of such cause and effect chains is infinite. It may be discussed if this approach is reasonable, 
as the probability of those negative scenarios does not equal zero, so they may appear and 
they may have greater negative consequences than the ones included in SWIFT. For instance, 
the probability of winning the main prize in a lottery is less than 1 out of 10 millions, but 
every week someone is winning. The same situation can happen in here, that the most 
improbable set of events may become a real threat, which is called black swan. 
 According to Aven & Krohn(2014) there are three types of black swans – 
unimaginable events, events that are judged to have a negligible probability and events not 
addressed in relevant risk assessment. All those three types can occur during the functioning 
of the installation and probably only after they occur they will be considered as explainable 
and predictable. Thus to reduce the risk connected to black swans the multidisciplinary teams 
should be formed, which broad knowledge may help to predict the unpredictable. Their 
brainstorming sessions and out of the box thinking can have a beneficial influence on 
analysing the risk picture from new perspectives or improving the existing safety solutions. In 
contradiction to following the same old standard procedures for years. 
 The discussion about those events and possible combinations could be shorter if the 
safety systems functioning at the facility were known. This would also give opportunity to 
include recommendations in SWIFT how to decrease the risk. According to the Polish law the 
company has to reveal in detail what kind of fluids were used during the hydraulic fracturing. 
But why the companies do not have an obligation to reveal, what kind of safety systems, 
procedures or measurements are implemented at the facility, as the consequences of the 
failures in many cases will be not limited by the parcel’s boundaries. It should be citizens 
right to know if their safety is provided and how it is provided. Even if the facility was 
meeting all the safety and setback requirements, it would give a possibility for everyone to 
decide on his own if he wants to live nearby or move out. A further implication of this 
solution is that companies may build up their public relations on showing how good are their 
safety systems. Also such a transparency of operators would cut all the rumours and 
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conjectures about the possible negative effects of failure at the facility. Presumably the 
companies would not be eager to reveal how are they providing safety at their wellsites  
without administrative restriction, however there is a simple denouement. The companies 
which do not want to share these information are obliged to buy or lease a certain amount of 
land around the wellsite, bigger than normally. It would be hard to fit this rule into the mining 
law, but the companies could decide how much worth is their confidentiality.  
 Soon, the Polish government is planning to facilitate the mining law and 
administrative procedures, as the existing one are full of complexities and ambiguity, which 
discourage western companies to invest in Polish shale. This might be a great opportunity to 
discuss the severity of this law, especially the setback rules, which in my opinion, on the basis 
of the thesis results, are not strict enough. For instance setback for wells with appearance of 
hydrogen sulphide from a single house is always 100m no matter if the radius of the 
anticipated contamination zone is 150m or 3 500m. Following this rule may lead to situation 
when someone will live in such a close distance to the well that, without even knowing on 
what kind of threat he is daily exposed, as according to the law all requirements are met.  The 
disaster in China showed that neglecting the appearance of hydrogen sulphide can be a huge 
mistake. Although it was a blowout not a leakage, it cannot be assumed that during the well 
testing even in shale the hydrogen sulphide would not appear. Or what is worse it would not 
leak somehow from the installation. After the leakage occurs the released gas is unstoppable, 
this means that unless there is impermeable shield surrounding the facility, the gas can 
threaten residents life. The only simple way to prevent this to happen is to rise the setback. 
Even though this thesis is not answering the question to what level the setback should be 
raised it showed that the existing ones are too indulgent. 
 The issue of hydrogen sulphide is discussed so thoroughly, because failures with its 
appearance are amongst the most severe, and even one event may have more fatalities than 
several other with a sulphur-free gas. If the setback was not changed it may be feasible to 
make some training for the residents living nearby, how to act when the hydrogen sulphide is 
released to the atmosphere. Such a training may be a life-saving experience, as the history 
shows many people instead of escaping when the contamination is bearable are closing at 
home at thinking that it will save their life which is a fatal mistake. Unfortunately such 
trainings can be misunderstood, as many people will not understand its preventive role, rather 
think that it is a sign that wellsite is more dangerous than they thought before. 
 If we look only on the QRA and SWIFT results, without drawing deeper conclusions, 
then clearly, Strzeszewo village and any other residential areas located not closer than 100m 
from the installation are completely safe. Only the operating personnel is exposed to the 
hazards, but it is their job and they are conscious where they are working. On the other hand  
every company which is performing well testing is hoping for positive results and stepping 
into production phase. In other words, if the results are promising the well testing installation 
will be replaced by the production one. This kind of installation is much more complicated 
and the gas is not longer flared, but have to be thoroughly treated and transported by the 
pipeline or liquefied. Both of these options are associated with additional risks, that are said to 
be more serious than gas flaring(EDM Services, 2008). This implies that even before the well 
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is drilled, the risk analysis for a given location should be performed, concerning that in this 
location the well testing and production installations will be functioning. So that, it will not 
appear that the reservoir parameters are satisfying for setting up the production, but the 
residents settlements are too close.  
 Another issue is lack of clear standards regarding tolerable risk in Poland. The 
common question for risk analysts is "how safe is safe?". As can be expected the operators in 
Poland are decreasing the predicted risk to the level which they regard as sufficient, which 
sustaining is not charging the budget too much. The lack of prospective reservoir discoveries 
is leading to emigration of companies form Poland or decreasing their budget for the further 
exploration activities. Consequently it may appear that the operators will cut the costs on the 
safety which is inexcusable. 
 In my opinion, if Poland wants to continue the dream about the shale gas Eldorado the 
government have to act quickly and make necessary changes to create a win-win situation, as 
soon as possible. Firstly, the strict safety standards have to be implemented, which are clear 
for everybody and leaves no room for any dangerous deviations. Secondly, due to 
complicated geological structure of Polish basins, the companies have to be encouraged 
somehow to invest their money. This can be done by offering them tax reliefs, simplified to 
maximum administrative procedures, postponed taxes or any other solution which is lowering 
their costs. Still it must not be economized on safety. If Poland do not want to miss its chance 
it cannot wait for the gas prices to rise to the profitable level with the existing law and 
administrative conditions. Poland should strike while the iron is hot.   
 Finally, the strengths, weaknesses and reliabilities of those two methods, SWIFT and 
QRA, and their results should be discussed. It cannot be said that these types of assessment 
are the most suitable for the risk analysis of well testing installation, as they were chosen 
primarily because of the master thesis requirements and secondly because of their advantages. 
It is possible that if the multidisciplinary team was obliged to perform such an assessment it 
would choose totally different methods. However it must be highlighted that those teams also 
have to search for a compromise between the most suitable methods and amount of available 
time, money and information. The main weakness of the assessments and their results is small 
degree of objectivism for SWIFT and a great amount of assumptions for the QRA. That is 
why the conservative approach was chosen to assure that even if the results are wrong, they 
are wrong in the safe direction for the locals. The main strength of these assessments is their 
simplicity and the level of details at where they are performed. As it was mentioned before the 
risk assessment should never be the sole indicator for the decision making process, but it 
should be used as a support for the risk informed decision making. Thus, even such simple 
methods are fulfilling this requirement. Moreover, if the client is not satisfied with the 
robustness of the risk analysis, he still knows what issues should be analysed more thoroughly 
and the further assessments may concentrate only on these issues. 
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10. Conclusions 
 The study was set out to explore the risks associated with functioning of the shale gas 
well testing installation and has identified the possible negative consequences of its failure. 
Lack of studies or literature about the negative surface consequences of operation of such an 
installation was the main reason for this thesis. The growth of shale gas industry led to 
increased fears concerning the hydraulic fracturing on a national scale, neglecting other 
threats connected to facilities of this kind. However, the residents living nearby the existing 
facilities were full of anxiety about their safety. That is why the thesis has tried to answer the 
question whether their fears are justified. 
 The SWIFT results indicated that the biggest threat, if the severity and probability are 
combined, is the abnormal sensors reading and the improper decision making on the base of 
these readings. Furthermore it was revealed that the most severe failures’ consequences would 
be created by the rupture of the biggest elements of the installation filled with hydrocarbons 
and methanol, as well as, rupture of the flowhead. The QRA focused on modelling the 
consequences of such ruptures of respectively K.O. vessel, test separator, surge tank, 
methanol tank, and flowhead. As a result the risk contours were created, which proved that 
the ruptures are not going to influence the safety of locals.  
 Apart from these two assessments the discussion was performed on whether the 
mining law is strict enough, especially concerning the appearance of hydrogen sulphide and 
the overall setback rules. In comparison to international standards and with knowledge about 
historical disaster, the Polish setback rules were found to be not strict enough. 
 Although the thesis were full of uncertainties and assumptions it has provided  reliable 
risk picture, probably not detailed enough to place the gas detectors but that was not a goal. 
The results of the thesis may be used for two purposes. Firstly it may be used to question the 
reliability of the operator's existing safety solutions and how they are providing safety for the 
residents. Secondly, the government or State Mining Authority may be asked to justify the 
low severity of the existing law in contradiction to complexity of administrative procedures in 
response to results of this thesis.  
 If there was any possibilities to continue or improving this study, it should begin with 
eliminating the uncertainties and assumptions to practicable minimum. It may also be feasible 
to simulate the dispersion of the raw gas containing different levels of hydrogen sulphide and 
the required setbacks for each concentration. Any further study should focus on analysing the 
production installation and its implications on the overall safety. Because it is very probable 
that the well testing installations will be replaced by the production ones, but the surroundings 
will not. 
 There are many pros and cons of developing the shale gas industry, but undoubtedly it 
is a great chance for a Polish society which may be not happen again soon. If in the pursuit for 
the money the safety standards are not neglected, then Poland may benefit from this industry 
for years without negative consequences for environment or society.  
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